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LOUIS FEINSTEIN, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Attorneys- Reinstatement- Questions Considered.-Court's
sole object, on application by disbarred attorney for reinstatement, is to determine whether his character is such that
he should be admitted to an office of trust.
[2] !d.-Reinstatement-Burden of Proof.-Burden of proof is on
disbarred attorney, applying for reinstatement, to satisfy
court by positive evidence that effort he has made toward
rehabilitation of his character has been successful.
[3] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Proof of present honesty and
integrity of disbarred attorney, applying for reinstatment,
must be sufficient to overcome the court's former adverse judgment of his character.
[4] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-An attorney who has been
disbarred for acts involving a high degree of moral turpitude
should be reinstated only on clear and convincing evidence
amounting to overwhelming proof of reform.
[5] Id.-Reinstatement-Pardon.-A pardon for the offense for
which an attorney was disbarred does not of itself reinvest
him with the qualities required of an attorney at law.
[6] !d.-Reinstatement-Effect of Certificate of Rehabilitation.Finding of certificate of rehabilitation (Pen. Code, § 4852.13)
that an attorney disbarred because of his conviction of an
offense is now of good moral character is not a finding that
he presently possesses the highest moral qualities required of
an attorney, nor is it binding on the State Bar or on the
Supreme Court (Pen. Code, § 4852.15), but at most is merely
evidence to be considered with other evidence of his present
qualifications to practice law.
[7] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Letters of recommendation
and favorable testimony of witnesses, especially that of employers and attorneys, are entitled to considerable weight in
a proceeding for reinstatement of a disbarred attorney, but
such evidence, however laudatory or great in quantity, is not
alone conclusive.

[1] See 9 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Practice of Law,
§ 108.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Attorneys, § 179; [2-4, 7] Attorneys, §184; [5,6] Attorneys, §177; [9) Attorneys, §187; [10)
Attorneys, § 185,
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[8] Id.- Reinstatement- Reformation.-Since reformation is a
"state of mind," a disbarred attorney applying for reinstatement must show a proper attitude of mind regarding his
offense before he can hope for reinstatement.
[9] !d.-Reinstatement-Review of Board's Action.-Although the
Supreme Court has plenary power to reinstate a disbarred
attorney, it will accord the greatest deference to the recommendation of the State Bar and its administrative committee,
and only where the record clearly demonstrates that the
applicant possesses an acceptable appreciation of the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney at law in relation to his
clients and the courts may a decision overruling the unfavorable action of the Board of Governors be justified.
[10] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Evidence is insufficient to
warrant the reinstatement of an attorney disbarred because
of his conviction of a felony where, notwithstanding an unconditional pardon following his release on parole and favorable testimony of witnesses showing commendable progress
by him in rehabilitating himself as a member of society, his
repeated assertions that he committed no wrong in issuing
certain fictitious checks, coupled with his failure to make any
attempt since his parole either to determine whether his
activities resulted in losses to others or to reimburse his
victims, indicate a continuing failure to comprehend his professional responsibilities.

APPLICATION for reinstatement of disbarred attorney.
Application denied.
J. H. Morris for Petitioner.
Hobert H. Edwards, Jr., and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent.
THE COUR'l'.-In 1938, upon conviction of a felony, Louis
Feinstein was disbarred. (Bar M~:--:r52'f.)"'fhe Board
of Governors of The State Bar upheld the action of an
administrative committee unanimously recommending the
denial of his petition for reinstatement. The matter is before
this court upon Feinstein's petition to review the board's
action. (Rules on Original Proceedings in Reviewing Courts,
rule 59 [b].)
Feinstein was admitted to practice in California in 1927.
He was convicted upon each of two counts of an indictment
which charged him with soliciting a client to commit grand
theft. (Pen. Code, § 653f.) The judgment of conviction was
affirmed (People v. Humphrey, 27 Oal.App.2d 631 [81 P.2d
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588]) and he was automatically disbarred. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 299 ; now Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6102.)
Concurrently with the eriminal aetion, disciplinary proceedings against Feinstein were pending before a local administrative committee of 'fhe State Bar upon charges of
issuing and passing fictitious checks. 'rhe committee unanimously recommended his disbarment and the Board of Governors approved the recommendation. (Bar Misc. No. 1541.)
Feinstein's petition to this court for a review of those proceedings was dismissed as having become moot because of
the previous order of disbarment based upon his conviction
in the criminal proceeding. (Feinstein v. State Bar, 12
Cal.2d 461 [85 P.2d 869] ; Hall v. State Bar, 12 Cal.2d 462
[85 P.2d 870] .)
Following his conviction, Feinstein was imprisoned until
his release on parole in 1940. Upon his release, he secured
employment as a salesman and bookkeeper and later entered
business for himself as a public accountant, which profession
he has followed to the present time. In 1950, Feinstein was
granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor
in accordance with the provisions of sections 4852.01 through
4852.2 of the Penal Code.
At the hearings upon his petition for reinstatement before
the local administrative committee, Feinstein produced 13
witnesses who testified to his good moral character, diligence,
and faithful performance of his work. Nine of these witnesses
had employed him for varying periods since his release from
prison. Three of them did not know that he had been disbarred. The other six knew, or surmised, that he had been
disbarred, but did not know the facts concerning his diffic
culties .
.All of the witnesses who had employed him were satisfied
with his work and had confidence in him, although only one
of them had ever had occasion to entrust him with any money.
Several who testified in his behalf indicated that they would
not hesitate to employ him in a capacity of trust or confidence should the occasion ever arise. The record includes
testimony by persons who know Feinstein and his family
socially. They said that his family relationships were excellent. Upon the request of Feinstein's counsel, the examiner
was prohibited from informing any of the witnesses who had
employed him of the details of Feinstein's disbarment or
questioning them as to whether such knowledge would alter
their opinions of him.
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The remaining four witnesses, three of whom are attorneys,
knew the details of Feinstein's disbarment. An optometrist
and two of the attorneys were personal friends of Feinstein,
but their contact with him since his parole was social only.
They rated Feinstein as having a high moral character before
as well as after his conviction. Their opinions that he now is
morally fit to practice law were based upon circumstances no
different from those existing before he was disbarred.
J. H. Morris, Feinstein's brother-in-law and his counsel
in this proceeding, testified that, in a discussion pertaining
to his reinstatement, Feinstein denied ever having made the
fraudulent suggestions attributed to him in the criminal
prosecution which resulted in his disbarment. Feinstein's
explanation of the bad check accusations, as related by Morris,
was that he had given the checks "sort of foolishly, without
realizing what he was doing." Morris believes Feinstein's
statement that he was not guilty of the charge of which
he was convicted and said he would have the same opinion
of Feinstein's high moral qualifications to practice law irrespective of this belief. Other than the present proceeding,
Morris has had no professional dealings with Feinstein. He
knew of no instance when Feinstein had been placed in a
confidential relationship which might have tempted him to
depart from an ethical course of conduct.
Testifying on his own behalf, Feinstein admitted the issuance of fictitious checks without sufficient funds to cover
them as charged in the disbarment proceeding. He also stated
that he knew his associate, Hall, was issuing similar checks.
He drew a line through the word ''order'' on the checks, he
said, to destroy their negotiability and give notice to third
parties that it was an ''unusual transaction.'' According to
Feinstein, ''it seemed to be held against me instead of for
me. I thought I was doing the right thing, and instead I
was doing the wrong thing. I shouldn't have done anything
like that at all.''
According to Feinstein's testimony, he drew the checks
to assist a client who was operating a night club. "I don't
think I collected more than a few hundred dollars at the
time this thing happened," he said. "It was contemplated
the more successful the night club was, the more work I did,
and the more money I would make, but he wasn't any large
client. It was a few hundred dollars involved, I guess.''
As stated by Feinstein to the committee, the bank's president informed him at the time of the disbarment proceeding
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that the bank had lost nothing and that he did not believe
Feinstein knew anything about the conspiracy to defraud it.
Feinstein has never made restitution to the bank for losses
occurring as the result of the check transactions, nor undertaken any further inquiry as to whether there were losses.
At the hearing upon his application for reinstatement,
Peinstein flatly denied any guilt in connection with the
fraudulent suits which were the basis for the criminal charges
which resulted in his conviction. He said: ''These cases were
cases of clients of mine where they admitted that they had
participated in a fake accident case. 'fhey testified against
me and the doctor. They were given complete immunity as a
result of it . . . it was either their skin or the skin of the
doctor and the lawyer." Later, he remarked: "I never knew
that either Callie Elliott or anybody else had been in a
fraudulent claim.'' Feinstein stated that he had never inquired as to whether any loss had resulted to the defendants
from the filing of suits in the negligence actions, nor had he
repaid any portion of the settlement received in one of those
cases.
Feinstein's income tax returns, admitted into evidence,
indicate that his income has steadily increased from approximately $4,500 in 1943 to about $13,000 in 1949. His ·1950
income was $13,000.
Regarding his legal ability, Feinstein testified that he
read advance sheets of an accountant's tax service from time
to time, had subscribed to the Southern California Law
Review and read a tax magazine containing comments on tax
law. One of the attorneys who had discussed hypothetical
legal problems with him found that he had a keen conception
of the applicable principles. Another attorney stated that
he and ]'einstein had discussed questions of law common to
tax matters from time to time.
Upon the foregoing evidence and the exhibits introduced,
including the documents in connection with the statutory
rehabilitation proceeding, the administrative committee unanimously concluded that Feinstein has not fully rehabilitated
himself, lacks the present moral qualifications to warrant his
reinstatement, and does not have present ability and learning
in the law sufficient to warrant his reinstatement. These
conclusions were adopted by the Board of Governors.
Feinstein contends that the evidence does not support
certain findings of the committee or the conclusions and
39 C.2d-18
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recommendations of the committee and the board. The evidence, he says, conclusively establishes his rehabilitation and
present good moral character. Concerning his legal ability
at this time, he offers to take an examination if ordered
to do so. 'fhe State Bar argues that Feinstein failed
to meet his burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is entitled to reinstatement.
Reduced to its basic essentials, Feinstein's argument is
that the evidence which he produced of his present good moral
character was undisputed. The State Bar, he says, offered
nothing to overcome this showing and relied solely upon the
offenses which led to his disbarment. It is his contention that
undue weight has been given to his past misconduct in reaching the conclusion that he has not been rehabilitated.
Throughout this proceeding, both in his testimony before the
committee and in his argument to this court, Feinstein has
contended that he never intentionally did any wrong and that
the testimony against him in the criminal case is suspect.
[1-3] ''The sole object of the court, upon an application
by an attorney previously disbarred for reinstatement to
practice, is to determine whether or not the character of the
applicant is such that he should be admitted to an office of
trust, and recommended to the public as a trustworthy person,
fit to be consulted by others in matters of confidence.
(Citation.) In such proceeding the burden of proof is upon
the one who seeks, after disbarment, to accomplish a restoration to the ranks of the legal profession, and before the court
may grant the petition for reinstatement it must be satisfied
and fully convinced by positive evidence that the effort he
has made toward rehabilitation of his character has been
successful. (Citations.) It is only reasonable that the person
seeking reinstatement, after disbarment, should be required
to present stronger proof of his present honesty and integrity
than one seeking admission for the first time whose character
has never been in question. In other words, in an application
for reinstatement, although treated by the court as a proceeding for admission, the proof presented must be sufficient
to overcome the court's former adverse judgment of applicant's character." (Kepler v. State Bar, 216 Cal. 52, 55
[13 P.2d 50] ; Beeks v. State Bar of California, 35 Cal.2d 268,
275 [217 P.2d 409]; McArthur v. State Bar, 28 Cal.2d 779,
788 [172 P.2d 55].)
[4] "One who has been disbarred for acts involving a
high degree of moral turpitude-and those committed by
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petitioner were of that character-' should not be reinstated
ln the ranks of the legal profession except upon the most
clear and convincing, nay, we will say upon overwhelming,
proof of reform__:_proof which we could with confidence lay
before the world in justification of a judgment again installing him in the profession . . . . '" (In re Morganstern,
85 Cal.App. 113, 117 [259 P. 90]; Wettlin v. State Bar, 24
Cal.2d 862, 869 [151 P.2d 255] ; In re Stevens, 59 Cal.App.
251, 254-255 [210 P. 442].)
[5] "It has been definitely determined by this court that
a pardon of an attorney previously disbarred on account of
his conviction of the offense of which he was subsequently
pardoned does not of itself reinvest him with those essentials
required of an attorney at law." (Wettlin v. State' Bar,
supra; In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 329 [41 P.2d 161, 42 P.2d
311].) [6] The finding of the certificate of rehabilitation
(Pen. Code, § 4852.13) that Feinstein is now of good moral
character is not one that he presently possesses the highest
moral qualities required of an attorney, nor is it binding
upon The State Bar or this court. (Pen. Code, § 4852.15.)
At most, it is but evidence to be considered together with other
evidence of his present qualifications to practice law. (In re
Lavine, supm.)
[7] Letters of recommendation and the favorable testimony of witnesses, especially that of employers and attorneys,
are entitled to considerable weight. (Pt·eston v. State Bar,
28 Ca1.2d 643, 650-651 [171 P.2d 435]; In re Andreani, 14
Cal.2d 736, 749-750 [97 P.2d 456] .) But such evidence,
however laudatory or great in quantity, is not alone conclusive. (Wettlin v. State Bar, supra; Kepler v. State Bar,
snpra, p. 56.) [8] Reformation is a "state of mind" (In re
Anclreani, supra, p. 749) and "the applicant must show a
proper attitude of mind regarding his offense before he can
hope for reinstatement." (Wettlin v. State Bar, supra,
p. 870.) The committee of The State Bar, which has an
opportunity to view the witnesses and the petitioner, is in a
better position than is the reviewing court, faced only with
the cold printed record, to determine the applicant's state
of mind. (In re Andreani, supra, p. 750; Vaughan v. State
Bar, 208 Cal. 740-745 [284 P. 909].) [9] Although this
court has plenary power to reinstate an applicant previously
disbarred, it has always accorded the greater deference to
the recommendation of The State Bar and its administrative
committee. (In re Lacey, 11 Cal.2d 699, 701 [81 P.2d 935] .)
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Only where the record clearly and convincingly demonstrates
that the applicant possesses an acceptable appreciation of
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law in relation to his clients and the courts may a decision overruling
the unfavorable action of the Board of Governors be justified.
(Beeks v. State Bar of Cal'ifornia, sttpra, p. 277.)
[10] The record here fails to meet the requirement of clear
and convincing proof of reform. The pardon and the favorable testimony of witnesses show commendable progress by
Feinstein in rehabilitating himself as a member of society,
but such improvement does not compel the conclusion that
he now has the hig·hest moral attributes required of an
attorney. To the contrary, his repeated assertions that, despite
his conviction and the other disciplinary proceedings against
him, he committed no wrong, coupled with his failure to
make any attempt since his parole either to determine whether
his activities resulted in losses to others or to reimburse his
victims, indicate a continuing failure to comprehend his professional responsibilities. Under some circumstances, "a
spirit of willingness, earnestness and sincerity" is sufficient
to permit reinstatement although it is not within the power
o£ the applicant to undo the damage which his acts have
caused to others. (In re Andreami, supra, p. 750; Preston v.
State Bar, supra, p. 650.) But Feinstein has shown no such
spirit, although it has been within his power not only to
determine what damage he had caused but to right at least
some of his wrongs.
There is nothing in the record which would justify this
court in ordering either immediate reinstatment or acceptance
of Feinstein as an applicant for examination upon his technical qualifications.
rrhe application of petitioner for reinstatement is denied.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Upon a record which conclusively establishes the right of
petitioner to be reinstated, the majority holds that reinstatement is not permissible because petitioner still protests his
innocence of the felony, the conviction upon which he was
disbarred, and because he has not restored money said to
have been improperly obtained by him. As will be shown,
there was nothing obtained by petitioner and hence there
is nothing for him to rrstore. lf Jack of penitence is shown
by clin{ling to one's honest assertion of innocence, then innocence is a crime rather than a virtue. If petitioner has not
now shown that he is rehabilitated, he never will be able to
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do so. In the face of a record which conclusively establishes
rehabilitation, the majority arbitrarily says to him: "You
must give up all hope of regaining your former position as
a member of the bar." Let us look at the facts.
First it was found that prior to the time of petitioner's
disbarment, disciplinary proceedings were pending against
him before the Board of Governors and the board had recommended disbarment. Petitioner's petition to this court for a
review of those proceedings was dismissed by this court because of the disbarment by reason of his conviction of a
felony on a different charge. (Feinstein v. State Bar, 12
Cal.2d 461 [85 P.2d 869] .) Thus no review of those proceedings has been had by this court and they have no bearing
on the instant case. The charge in those proceedings arose
out of the issuing and passing of two :fictitious checks of
$475 each, and eleven checks totalling $4,200. According to
the :findings in those proceedings, petitioner had as a client
a Mr. Zimmer who controlled a corporation which owned
a cafe. For his legal services to the corporation and past
loans, petitioner was to receive 25 per cent of the profits of
the business ; later changed to :fixed weekly installments.
Zimmer was short of capital and had an arrangement with
tellers of a Hollywood bank permitting him to overdraw his
and the corporation's accounts, which eventually led to a
loss by the bank of $20,000. Zimmer told petitioner of the
arrangement and asked him to loan him checks drawn on his
account in the same bank and Zimmer would cover them with
cash deposits to petitioner's account from cafe receipts; some
checks were to be sold to a third person. The arrangement
was carried out by petitioner who gave checks which he had
rendered nonnegotiable by drawing a line through the word
''order.'' This would not ordinarily be observed. 'l'he Zimmer
affair resulted in his being indicted by a federal grand jury
but the proceeding was dismissed. It also appears that the
president of the bank tolcl petitioner that he was not liable,
as he did not know of the deal between Zimmer and the bank
tellers. Hence, even if we give consideration to the Zimmer
transactions, petitioner was under no obligation to refund
anything to the bank. He received nothing and we have the
bank president's word that nothing was owing.
In addition to the foregoing facts, the committee also found
that since petitioner's release from prison in 1940 he has
operated the business of public accountant, having obtained
a certificate in 1945 from the state board to do so. In addi-
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tion to his own testimony he produced 13 witnesses, three
of whom were attorneys, one an optometrist and the others
persons who had employed him as a bookkeeper. Those for
whom he kept books testified that he faithfully discharged
his duties, and in one case that he had been entrusted with
substantial sums of money and faithfully accounted for his
trust. Some of those witnesses said he had not handled matters
for them involving a trust or confidential relationship. One
attorney testified that he was rehabilitated and knew the
law, but his only relationship with him consisted of discussions
of his own cases. Another, a relative, said he had been rehabilitated. As to his legal ability, he testified that he read
advance sheets of accountant's tax service from time to time,
received the Southern California Law Review and read a
tax magazine containing comments on tax law. The committee
concluded by finding that petitioner had failed to sustain
the burden of proving that he had rehabilitated himself, or
had the moral qualifications, or had sufficient learning or
ability in the law.
The recommendation of the board is based solely upon the
conduct of petitioner between 1935 and 1937, and the asserted
failure of petitioner to prove his rehabilitation. No other
evidence was offered by it. On the other hand, petitioner produced testimony by n'ine witnesses engaged in various businesses who have employed him as tax consultant, accountant
and bookkeeper for periods ranging from five to eleven years.
They all testified that his work was accurate and satisfactory.
Various remarks were made to the effect that his character
is ''above reproach'' ; that ''if he conducts himself as well
as an attorney as he does as an accountant he would make
a very good attorney"; that he is honest in all respects,
trustworthy and highly honorable; that: ''I would not be
afraid to trust the man with the entire store and let him
take care of it. I trust him fully, he is a trustworthy person."
While only one witness testified that he had entrusted him
with his funds, others said they would be willing to do so
if there were any occasion for it. Some witnesses testified
that they had not employed him in a confidential capacity,
and apparently they had no occasion to do so, but if they had,
they would not hesitate to engage him for such work. Some
of the witnesses knew and some did not know he had been
disbarred in 1938, but some of those without that knowledge
said it would have made no difference in their testimony.
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Three attorneys practicing in Los Angeles testified for
petitioner. One who had known him for 26 years and was
associated with him for a short time, knew of the disbarment
and talked to him about it, testified that he now has a good
sense of morality, has proven himself to be of good moral
character and fit to practice law. Another testified to substantially the same effect. Counsel for petitioner in this proceeding, a brother-in-law of petitioner, testified that he has
known petitioner since 1944; has had discussions on legal
questions with him and found him understanding of them;
that petitioner is morally rehabilitated. An optometrist, who
had been a friend for 15 years, stated that petitioner had a
good reputation for honesty.
Petitioner testified at length regarding his activities both
before and after disbarment in which he denied any wrongdoing in the Zimmer matter; that he did not make restitution
to the bank or anyone else because no money was received
by him and he did not incur any liability or indebtedness.
He made special studies in accounting in prison and thereafter, but none in law.
It is the position of respondent that the burden was on
petitioner to show that he had become rehabilitated, is now
of good moral character and learned in the law (see Beeks
v. State Bar of California, 35 Cal.2d 268 [217 P.2d 409];
R,ules of Procedure of The State Bar, rule 52) ; that the past
conduct of petitioner discloses a mental attitude of a person
who would commit a wrong when placed in a position of trust
and confidence if he thought he could escape retribution.
In respect to the latter contention it would seem more
accurate to describe petitioner's mental attitude to be that
of an attorney who would use his office to obtain wrongfully
something from third persons with whom he did not occupy
a position of confidence, as the crime of which he was convicted, or which, like the Zimmer affair, did not involve the
defrauding of his client but the gaining of something from
someone else for his client and himself. And he has conclusively proven by the many witnesses above mentioned that
he is not now the kind of a person who would attempt to
obtain money from others by fraud. Indeed it has been held
that the conduct leading to the prior disbarment is too remote
to be considered on application for reinstatement (In re
8toller, 160 Fla. 769 [36 So.2d 443]), and the essential question is whether he has reformed and his moral stability has
been restored. It must be remembered that prior to the
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incidents above mentioned, which occurred between 1935 and
1937, he had not been involved in any difficulty and his good
moral character was established when he was admitted to
the bar.
Moral reformation or rehabilitation has long been a perplexing problem to such experts as penologists, psychologists,
theologians and social workers. \Vhen laymen endeavor to
ascertain the fact on the evidence of lay witnesses, the
problem becomes even more complex. It is very difficult for
an attorney seeking reinstatement to produce witnesses who
have sufficient intimate knowledge of his conduct both before
and after his disbarment to give an opinion as to whether
the applicant has been fully rehabilitated. In most cases,
witnesses available to the applicant are those who, because
of their association with him after his disbarment, can testify
that he then, at the time of the hearing, has a good moral
character-a reputation for that character. This evidence
is pertinent because a strong inference flows from his continuous good character since disbarment that he will not
again resort to practices which might bring him into disrepute. To weigh against that evidence the nature of his
misconduct and conclude that he has not been rehabilitated,
is to reject such testimony and the inference which flows
therefrom. It verges on reaching a conclusion that some
misconduct may be considered so reprehensible that reformation is impossible. If it does not go that far, the decision
of the arbiter becomes mere speculation, because he is required to weigh the seriousness of the wrong committed
against positive evidence that the person now has a good
character, the effect of the former factor on possibility of
reformation being a mere matter of personal opinion which
the applicant is helpless to supply evidence to rebut. The
gravity of the offense should not, therefore, be of compelling
consequence. The character or nature of the misconduct is
of importance however, that is, what was done under what
circumstances. Tt is then possible for the applicant to present
evidence by acquaintances that under circumstances of a
similar character generally he has properly conducted himself-has not fallen into a similar pattern of wrongdoing.
Of course, the length of time that applicant has kept himself
on the side of rectitude is important, for it may be inferred
that the longer he has been honest, the more likely he will
Rta~v that way. In this connection, the majority opinion suggests that the testimony of petitioner's witnesses shows that
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it was not based on circumstances different from those exist-

ing before disbarment; they thought he was honest before
and still think he is. That is not true of all of the witnesses
and does not erase the positive, unrefuted evidence that petitioner is now of good moral character.
In the instant case petitioner has produced such evidence.
He has shown generally, without dispute, that he now has
a good moral character. ·while some of his witnesses said
they had not employed petitioner in a confidential capacity,
others had, and it should be clear that where one employs
another to keep his books and prepare his tax returns, the
employer is placing all the facts relating to his business in
the employee's hands, a thing he would not do if he did not
trust the employee. In tax return work, applicant had an
opportunity to defraud the government to his employer's
direct benefit and his own incidental benefit, but did not do
so. If he had, it would be a pattern of misconduct similar
to that in which he indulged between 1935 and 1937. Neither
the committee nor the board found that they disbelieved
petitioner's witnesses. Over 12 years have elapsed since the
disbarment. If that cannot be considered sufficient time, then
most of our parole proceedings and penalties for various
offenses lack a sound foundation.
Furthermore, it will be recalled that petitioner was granted
a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor. While it
has been held that a pardon does not restore to a disbarred
attorney the right to practice law (Wettlin v. State Bar, 24
Cal.2d 862 [151 P.2d 255] ; In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324 [41 P.2d
161, 42 P.2d 311]), it is clear that great weight must be given
to pardons such as the one here involved. The pardon granted
petitioner•was pursuant to provisions added to the Penal Code
in 1943. (Pen. Code, §§ 4852.01-4852.2.) Thereunder a released
prisoner may file with the superior court of the county in which
he resides a notice of intention to apply for a "certificate
of 1·ehabilitation." (Pen. Code, § 4852.01.) "During the
period of rehabilitation the person shall live an honest and
upright life, shall conduct himself with sobriety and industry,
shall exhibit a good rnoral character, and shall conform to
and obey the laws of the land." (Emphasis added.) (ld.,
§ 4852.05.) After the period for rehabilitation has expired
he may apply to the court for a "declaration of the fact of
his rehabilitation"-for a "certificate of rehabilitation."
(Id., § 4852.06.) Notice is given of the application to the district attorney, chief of police and Governor. (ld., § 4852.07.)
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A hearing is had in which is considered testimony and ''all
records and reports relating to the petitioner and the crime
of which he was convicted, including the record of the trial,
the report of the probation officer, if any, the records of
the prison from which the petitioner has been released showing his conduct during the time he was there imprisoned,
the records of the prison doctor and the prison psychiatrist,
the records of the parole officer concerning him if he was
released on parole, the records of the Youth Correction Authority concerning him if he has been committed to the
authority, the records of the chief of police or sheriff upon
whom the notice of intention was served, and written reports
or records of any other law enforcement agency concerning
the conduct of the petitioner since his release on parole or
discharge from custody." (Id., § 4852.1.) Moreover, the
court "shall require from the district attorney an investigation of the residence of the petitioner, the criminal record
of the petitioner as shown by the records of the Bureau of
Criminal Identification and Investigation, and the investigation of any representation made to the court by the applicant,
and the district attorney shall file with the court a full and
complete report of the results of said investigations, and
shall require from the district attorney and the chief of
police or sheriff having jurisdiction as provided in subdivision
(a) of Section 4852.02 written reports setting forth all matters
within their knowledge relating to the conduct of the petitioner during his period of rehabilitation, including all
matters mentioned in Section 4852.11." (I d., § 4852.12.)
(It should be noted that many more sources are used to
determine rehabilitation than are customarily available in
reinstatement proceedings before The State Bar.) H the court
after the hearing "finds that the petitioner has demonstrated
by his course of conduct his rehabilitation and his fitness to
exercise aU of the civil and political rights of citizenship, the
court shall make an order declaring that the petitioner has
been rehabilitated and recommending that the Governor grant
a full pardon to the petitioner." (Emphasis added.) (Id.,
§ 4852.13.) Thus, the precise fact, moral rehabilitation and
whether petitioner has exhibited a good moral character,
decided by the court, is presented to The State Bar on application for reinstatement. It was observed by this court, with
respect to the use of a transcript of testimony at a criminal
trial in a disbarment proceeding: "Petitioner was prosecuted
in the name of the People of California, and the trial was
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conducted by attorneys representing the People. In the
present proceeding the case against petitioner is presented
by The State Bar, acting as the arm of this court and also
representing the People of the State. In reality the parties
are the same. Petitioner's contention that the subject matter
is not the same is based on the fact that this proceeding is
for disbarment, whereas the earlier case was a criminal
prosecution. The Legislature, however, aware that a disbarment proceeding is different from any other type of action,
could hardly have intended to preclude the use of the transcript of an earlier proceeding in a proceeding for disbarment.
The State Bar seeks to prove the same facts that the public
prosecutor sought to prove so that both proceedings actually
do concern the same matter." (Werner v. State Bar, 24
Cal.2d 611, 616 [150 P .2d 892].) It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner's certificate of rehabilitation is a very
cogent factor. It is not like an ordinary pardon where the
motive or basis may be merely sympathy or forgiveness.
A point is made of the failure of petitioner to make restitution. This is not a case of misuse of a client's funds and
here it does not appear that petitioner received anything or
that anyone was entitled to or claimed a right to the restoration of anything.
Respondent claims a lack of showing of legal ability to
practice. As above shown, there is evidence that petitioner
has such ability. Moreover, he is a college graduate, a graduate
of a law school of high standing, and practiced law for over
ten years. It will not be presumed he has lost his knowledge.
The presumption is the other way. (See Friday v. State Bar,
23 Ca1.2d 501 [144 P.2d 564].) Moreover, petitioner offers
to take a legal examination if this court deems it necessary.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the only just and
and reasonable result is reinstatement. The basis of the
majority opinion seems to be that petitioner has not made a
lachrymose display of penitence, or come to the Throne of
Grace humbly begging forgiveness for sins he claims not
to have committed. Not only that, but he must apparently
produce witnesses who have heard him shout from the rooftops that he was a sinner but has forsaken his sins and is
now redeemed. The majority seems to have forgotten that
deeds speak londer than self-serving protestations. By the
record petitioner has conclusively demonstrated that his conduct since disbarment bas established rehabilitation. Nothing
more should be required under any system which has for its
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objective the accomplishment of the American ideal of ''Equal
jristice under law."
I would reinstate petitioner as a member of the bar.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied October
9, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

[Crim. No. 5324. In Bank. Sept. 19, 1952.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. BRYAN K. BURNETT,
Appellant.
[1] False Pretenses-Issuing Checks Without Sufficient FundsInstructions.-Instruction that it is a question for jury whether
intent to defraud is shown if payee is informed by maker of
check at time of delivery that there are insufficient funds
to pay it is error, since there can be no conviction under
Pen. Code, § 476a, where the payee is so informed.
[2] Id.- Issuing Checks Without Sufficient Funds- AppealHarmless and Reversible Error.-Erroneous instruction that
it is jury question whether intent to defraud is shown if
payee is informed by maker of check at time of delivery that
there are insufficient funds to pay it was prejudicial, where
the instruction was not limited to the c,ount as to which the
jury disagreed, and where, even though it be assumed that the
jurors had already reached an agreement as to the count on
which defendant was convicted, it is possible that such instruction caused them to reconsider and change their position.
[3a, 3b] !d.-Issuing Checks Without Sufficient Funds-AppealHarmless Error.-Where there is evidence that a postdated
check was given in conjunction with a currently dated check,
and that both checks were given at the same time in payment
of a single debt under circumstances from which it may be
inferred that the payee accepted the postdated check with
notice that there were insufficient funds and hence that there
was no intent to defraud, an erroneous instruction that it is
a jury question whether intent to defraud is shown if payee
is informed by maker of check at time of delivery that there
are insufficient funds to pay it is prejudicial.
[1] See Cal.Jur., False Pretenses, § 28; Am.Jur., False Pretenses
and Allied Criminal Frauds, § 66.
·
McK. Dig. References: [1] False Pretenses, § 68; (2l3] False
Pretenses, § 69; [ 4] False Pretenses, § 66,

